# SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT PART ONE – COUNTRY-WIDE

## CoPREP



**FINAL REPORT**
**MARCH, 2022**

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

The Security Management Framework is a guidance document for the future stages of the COVID-19 vaccination programme in Nigeria. An initial Security Risk Assessment was carried out in six states within the six geo-political zones in Nigeria to identify threats and challenges to the COVID-19 vaccination programme. An analysis of both unique and common threats was carried out to further develop mitigative measures against these threats. The Framework provides a model on which the state vaccination programmes can develop its own security plan to operate effectively by the safest means, based on best practice.

A major security issue identified is the absence of a structured security architecture, dedicated to ensuring compliance to World Bank standards and practices, which protects personnel, the people being vaccinated and the environment. A security structure will ensure that the different security agencies follow set rules of engagement to handle issues like crowd control, conflict escalation or de-escalation, as well as trust building with local people. The document also identifies infrastructure and logistic challenges that have slowed the previous COVID-19 vaccine rollout, as well as strategies to overcome issues of acceptance of the vaccine by unenlightened Nigerians.

The assessment was done in a professional manner, to the set standard of previous security assessments, regardless of lack of engagement in some quarters. It is the hope of this team that the recommendations contained in this Framework will lead to a more efficient and effective COVID-19 vaccination roll out.

# 1. INTRODUCTION.

## 1.1. APPROACH.

The Government of Nigeria (GoN), through the Ministry of Health and Nigeria Centre for Disease Control, with support from the World Bank, is implementing the Nigeria COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project (CoPREP). The Parent Project became effective on March 15, 2021, although field implementation is yet to commence. The GoN is seeking Additional Financing (AF) of US$ 400 million equivalent and a restructuring of the parent project. The upfront financing will help the government purchase and deploy COVID-19 vaccines that meet the Bank's Vaccine Approval Criteria (VAC). It will also strengthen health systems that are necessary for a successful deployment and prepare for the future. The project development objective of the CoPREP Projects, Parent Project, Additional Financing and the Restructured Project is to prevent, detect, and respond to the threat posed by COVID-19 at the state level in Nigeria.

The CoPREP Project will be coordinated by the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) through its Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) with support from the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) for the vaccine component. The CoPREP Projects is to be implemented in the 36 states in Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja. This document was prepared by Spearfish West Africa on behalf of NCDC/REDISSE PCU towards the Security Risk Assessments and develop a strategic Security Management Framework which supports the safe delivery of the vaccination programme across the country.

## 1.2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION.

The Consultant will conduct Security Risk Assessments (SRA) based on a representational state in each of the 6 geopolitical regions and develop a Security Management Framework through which the programme can be delivered to communities safely and without the use of excessive force by security personnel or any action by them to impinge the human rights of members of the community. A key aim of the work is to ensure the provision of the right level of security, provided by the most suitable security agency, based on the geopolitical zone, in order to strike the right balance of community trust and security to allow the vaccination programme to be safely and smoothly delivered. The SRA studies, which includes evaluation of the current security strategy and institutional structures in the selected state, will contribute to the

design of a Security Management Framework which will provide stakeholders with a delivery template. This template will form the security basis for the delivery model, which can then be adjusted and refined to accommodate the security specifics in each state and LGA.

## 1.3. SCOPE OF WORK.

The primary scope of work will be based on the guidelines set by the CoPREP ToR and the World Bank Security Specialist through the PCU Team to conduct the risk assessment of each state, review the past strategy and develop a strategic security management framework.

## 1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE SECURITY CONSULTANCY.

### 1.4.1. SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT.

The SRA will outline all foreseeable threats—to the project and communities—stemming from the project's presence and activities especially from the use of security operatives (NPF and NSCDC) and develop effective mitigation measures to address risks associated with the use of security operatives. In addition to the conventional risks, the report will consider the specific nature of the CoPREP, especially its supply chain management, logistics requirements and possible disruptions for the project, identifying known and unknown risks. Possible disruptions to supply chain channels and logistics platforms will be identified and consideration given to how this may impact the project.

- The SRA process will include document review, site visits to selected regional hotspots, interviews with key internal and external security stakeholders, along with a final report with recommendations.

- The SRA will include a security due diligence review of the project and provide a detailed due diligence report describing the level of conformance with local laws, applicable security requirements, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and security-related aspects of the WB's Environmental & Social Standard (ESS) 4.

- The Security Risk Assessment will include information regarding relations with public security plus risks and recommendations regarding other issues.

- The Security Risk Assessment will include a catalogue of all known risks and will evaluate their likelihood to occur (Risk assessment Matrix), document the likely response(s), and assess their potential impacts.

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Risks will be articulated in either risk statements or risk scenarios. Mitigation measures to reduce these risks will be identified.

- The principle of 'do no harm' and the risk of civilian abuse by security agencies will be considered as a threat factor.

- Project risks will be assessed based on exposure/vulnerability to each of the threat factors for each state.

### 1.4.2. SECURITY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK.

The Security Management Framework will be predicated on integration of the principles of socially responsible security into management systems. The following components will be included, with the structure determined in conjunction with the PCU:

- Purpose of Security Management

- Policies and Standards

- Situation Overview

- Physical Security

- Procedures

- Security Supervision and Control

- Nigeria CoPREP

- ToR: Security Risk Assessment & Security Management Framework

- Private Security Management

- Security-Contractor Management

- Managing Relations with Public Security

- Managing Uniform Security in IDA supported project

- Incident Reporting and Inquiry

- Community Engagement

- Journey management

Other Details:

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- A draft memorandum will be developed to capture the understanding or other agreement with public security, including commitment to the project's Code of Conduct and outlining disciplinary action process. As public security personnel will be assigned to the project to provide some aspects of security, the MoU will include provision of any equipment or other support, the role of the public security force, joint contingency planning, and coordination mechanisms.

- The framework will include guidelines for command and control between CoPREP field managers and the supporting security agency.

- The framework document will describe a procedure for Security Personnel Background Screening: The project will agree with public security how individuals assigned to the project will be properly vetted, including how any allegations of past abuses, inappropriate use of force, or other criminal activity and wrongdoing will be considered prior to allowing an individual to be assigned to the project.

- Security Personnel Equipment: Describe equipment to be provided to guards, including vehicles, radios, nonlethal weapons, and any firearms and ammunition.

- Security Use of Force: The framework document will include a suggest 'Rules of Engagement' (RoE), to be agreed with public security providers as part of the MoU signing process. The RoE will define the project's principles regarding use of force. The MoU or other legal agreement will state that those who are armed must exhibit high levels of technical and professional proficiency and clearly understand the rules for the proportional use of force.

- Security Personnel Training: The framework document will propose an induction training syllabus for both CoPREP staff and supporting security agency personnel, to include project Code of Conduct, health and safety requirements that relate to the project, and the public and worker grievance mechanisms. A system of training record management will be included.

- Allegations of Misconduct: The framework document will propose an investigation and disciplinary process for those who violate the project Code of Conduct or RoE.

## 1.5. METHODOLOGY.

A recognised methodology for the conduct of SRAs, as detailed below:

Proper assessment of risk is a critical component of the security risk management process (see right) and an area in which organisations have advanced significantly in recent years, thanks to research in risk management theory, psychology and among humanitarian organisations.

A formal Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is a structured and systematic process that identifies how programme objectives may be affected by security and safety related risks. An SRA provides decision makers with an understanding of risks, their causes, consequences, and their probabilities. Risk assessment attempts to answer the following fundamental questions:

- What can happen and why?

- What are the consequences?

- What is the probability of their future occurrence?

- What are the factors that mitigate the consequence of the risk or that reduce the probability of the risk?

- Is the level of risk tolerable or acceptable, or does it require further treatment?

The primary objective of an SRA is to allow decision makers to weigh the risks of implementing an activity against the benefits it provides to beneficiaries. A good SRA will also allow for the development of context-appropriate security regulations, plans, procedures, and trainings, making it the foundation of a good security management system.

During the first two weeks of the contract, our consultant will familiarize himself with extant NCDC policy and procedures. He will work with the PCU to identify appropriate state level stakeholders and arrange a travel and meeting schedule to interface with the appropriate individuals and organisations. The

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SRAs will be developed in tandem with individual State visits during Weeks 3-5.

The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights will apply particularly in the selection and use of a security force appropriate to the geographic region. For instance, in the North East this may consist of the Army and the Civilian Joint Task Force rather than NPF or NSCDC, in the South West it might be more appropriate to use MoPol and the Western Nigeria Security Force (Amotekun). The compliance levels of the various forces will be assessed as part of the SRA process.

The SRA will encompass wider societal issues within specific states, especially the relationship between security entities and communities. The SRA methodology progresses through logical steps to the eventual generation of a Risk Matrix. This will be generated for each state, with the obvious caveat that some threats are trans-State, so will be repeated for neighbouring states. Exposure and vulnerability will be related to granular threats within the compass of specific project delivery. Project risks will be variable and directly linked to the varying geographic threat type and levels present in each region.

The strategic Security Management Framework based on the generic Nigeria security context and on the findings of the SRAs, which will themselves be predicated on the use of a detailed incident data set from which trends and probabilities can be deduced. From this data, potential incident trends and the probable direction of travel (escalation or reduction) by security type, severity and frequency can be added. This will assist in identifying trigger points which will either prompt an escalation of security measures or a decision to suspend activity (dependent on NCDC's level of risk tolerance).

Throughout the assessment and document development process, the key tenets of the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework will be the guiding force. Specifically, ESS 4 (Community Health and Safety) which establishes the importance of:

(i) the risks and impacts of the project on the health and safety of the affected communities during the project life cycle, including those who, because of their particular circumstances, may be vulnerable;

(ii) the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of the structural elements of the project in accordance with national legal requirements, the

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EHSGs and other GIIP, taking into consideration safety risks to third parties and affected communities;

(iii) the establishment and implementation of appropriate quality management systems to anticipate and minimize risks and impacts that such services may have on community health and safety;

(iv) the application of the principles of proportionality and GIIP, and applicable law in relation to hiring, rules of conduct, training, equipping, and monitoring of security workers where direct or contracted workers are to provide security to safeguard project personnel and property.

## 1.6. RISK IDENTIFICATION.

In carrying out this risk assessment, a wide range of information sources have been used, including but not limited to:

- Feedback with site development employees via an SRA checklist.

- Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO).

- US Department of State - Bureau of Consular Affairs.

- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

- Open and closed commercial security sources available to the consultant.

- Discussion and peer review within the Consultant management team.

In identifying the key risks, several factors were considered such as:

- The threat of terrorists or criminal gangs targeting the vaccine programme.

- The threat of civil unrest in the proximity of vaccine programme locations.

- The risk of natural disasters, particularly flooding and heat.

- Reputational, political and financial risks to the project and the donor.

# 2. POLICY, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.

## 2.1. OVERVIEW.

Nigeria has detailed policies and plans in both the fields of national security and in health care. In regard to national security, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) has the lead to integrate human security into the national security management framework. For health, the current National Action Plan for Health security is the overarching plan for delivery whilst accommodating the nation's many complex and dynamic security issues.

In the '90s the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) made a case for the expansion of the scope of security to include threats in the seven areas of Economic security; Food security; Health security; Environmental security; Personal security; Community security; and Political security, promoting the case that 'human security is an approach to assist the Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people.'[1] This paradigm is evident in both Nigeria's current national security strategy and its health care policy.

## 2.2. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.

NSS 2019 identifies Nigeria's key security threats as including global challenges; terrorism; transnational organized crimes; crude oil theft or illegal bunkering; Nigeria's borders; climate change; communal and ethno-religious conflicts; pastoralist-farmer conflicts; politics and federalism in Nigeria; governance; poverty; kidnaping, proliferation of small arms and light weapons; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; illegal migration; economic challenges; financial crimes; information technology and cyber security; natural, man-made and medical related threats; environmental security.

## 2.3. NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY.

In 2018, Nigeria developed a National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS).[2] The NAPHS activities were prioritized based on the country-specific

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[1] United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290.
[2] National Action Plan for Health Security (2018-2022), Nov 2018

risks, the potential or existing resources available, and the strategic plans of the participating MDAs.

This National Action Plan for Health Security (NAPHS) seeks to strengthen the IHR core capacities by adopting strategies, establishing priorities, and implementing activities intended to close the identified gaps with the goal of preventing, detecting, and responding to public health threats. The NAPHS is a 5-year strategic plan developed collaboratively with relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

The country adopted a multi-sectoral approached hinged on the principles of 'One Health' with significant participation in the process from stakeholders from relevant government ministries and agencies, including security authorities. These included the Office of the National Security Adviser and the Federal Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, Environment, Mines and Steel Development, Finance, Budget and National Planning, Defence, Transport, Science and Technology, Justice, and Information.

The NAPHS was developed by linking existing national plans, including the National Health Sector Development Plan II (NHSDP II), NCDC Strategy and Implementation Plan 2017–2021, Nigeria National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR), Infection, Prevention, and Control (IPC) Action Plan, and NSIPSS as they pertained to health security.

The NAPHS narrative on the Enhanced Immunisation Plan does identify security as a limiting factor in the delivery of a country wide immunisation programme, noting limitations as:

- Low immunization coverage especially in hard to reach and security compromised areas

- Vaccine hesitancy/non-compliance.

- Poor attitude and inadequate capacity of health care workers

- Poor implementation of Primary Health Care Under One Roof (PHCUOR) strategy

- Inadequate cold chain capacity at all (national, zonal, state LGA and ward) levels.

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## 2.4. CONCLUSION.

Although there is an apparent synergy between the national security ambitions of the ONSA and NCDC's REDISSE project delivery of Covid-19 vaccinations across the country, there is a lack of granularity as to which security apparatus will be responsible for providing security support to the programme in those parts of the country which face locally or regionally specific security challenges.

The next section commences the country-level Security Risk Assessment, that gives an overview of high level and country-wide risks and should be read before the state level SRA's which delve into greater local issues on a state-by-state basis.

# 3. COUNTRY CONTEXT.

### 3.1. GEOGRAPHY.

In 2021, the major urban areas by population were estimated to be Lagos (14.862 million), Kano (4.103 million), Ibadan (3.649 million), Abuja (3.464 million), Port Harcourt (3.171 million) and Benin City (1.782 million). There are also 'significant population clusters' throughout Nigeria, with the highest density areas in the south and south-west of the country.

Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones, commonly just called zones. They are a type of administrative division grouping the country's states. Nigerian economic, political, and educational resources are often shared across the zones.



The six zones were not entirely carved out based on geographic location, but rather states with similar ethnic groups, and/or common political history were classified in the same zone. Nigeria is made up of approximately 400 ethnic groups and 450 languages. There was a need for the government to merge similar groups for effective allocation of resources.

### 3.2. POPULATION ESTIMATES.

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country. The last official census, conducted in 2006, gave the country's population as 140.4 million. The National Bureau of Statistics' 2016 estimate was 193.4 million. Nigeria's Population Commission's 'Worldometer' reading as at 3$^{rd}$ March 2022 estimates the population as 215 million. The CIA World Factbook estimated the population at 219.4M as of July 2021. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stated in March 2021 that Nigeria's population is 'growing rapidly' with an annual population growth rate of 3.2 % and with over 41 % of Nigeria's population under the age of 15. There are plans to conduct a census during 2022 in advance of the 2023 elections.

### 3.3. ETHNICITY AND RELIGION.

Nigeria is estimated to have over 250 ethnic groups and around 500 diverse ethnolinguistic groups.32 The main ethnic groups are Hausa 30 %, Yoruba 15.5 %, Igbo (Ibo) 15.2 %, Fulani 6 %, Tiv 2.4 %, Kanuri/Beriberi 2.4 %, Ibibio 1.8 %, Ijaw/Izon 1.8 %, and those classified as 'other' 24.7 %.

Islam is the religion of 53.5 % of Nigerians and is the dominant religion in the north, with Christianity dominant in the south (RC – 10.6%, other Christian beliefs – 35.3%). 0.6 % of the population still hold traditional religious beliefs.

### 3.4. ECONOMY.

In 2020, Nigeria had the highest gross domestic product (GDP) in Africa. It remains heavily reliant on oil as its main source of foreign exchange earnings, accounting for 80 % of exports, half of government revenues and a third of banking sector credit.

In 2020 the Nigerian economy experienced a recession due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall in global oil prices. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that the economy contracted by 3.2 %. The impact on revenue has curtailed service delivery and social safety net programmes. Inflation in food prices has affected household consumption and access to food for the most vulnerable. According to the World Bank, 40 % (83 million people) live below the poverty line ($1.90/day) and a further 25 % (53 million) are vulnerable. It is estimated that 27 % of Nigeria's labour force (over 21 million Nigerians) remain unemployed.

### 3.5. POLITICAL SITUATION.

Following decades of military rule, Nigeria has been a multiparty democracy since 1999. It has a bicameral legislature comprising a 109-member Senate and a 360-member House of Representatives. Political parties alternate their candidates for elected office on an 'ethno-regional' basis, also referred to as the Federal Quota System. This system has polarised regional politics with the result that elections often serve as flashpoints for violence.

### 3.6. 2023 ELECTIONS.

Presidential and legislative elections were last held in early 2019. President Muhammadu Buhari was re-elected, and the All-Progressives Congress (APC) regained its legislative majority, holding 217 national assembly seats, 64 senate seats and 19 of 36 state governors.  President Buhari completes his second tenure in 2023 and political manoeuvering has already become a regular topic of discussion, both in the media and among Nigerians.

### 3.7. SECURITY SITUATION.

The specifics of each security threat in relation to the geopolitical zones are covered in Part 2 – Security Risk Assessments. Nigeria's long-standing security challenges include:

- Militant Islamists predominantly active in the North-East Region but moving into north-western states.

- Violence related to Organised Criminal Gangs (OCGs), commonly referred to as bandits, and criminal violence in the North-West and North-Central Regions.

- Street gangs and Organised Criminal Gangs (OCGs) in the South-West Region.

- Conflict between farmers and herders mainly in the North West and Middle Belt, but increasingly occurring in southern states.

- Communal and ethnic clashes in the North-Central Region and increasingly in the southern states.

- Biafra separatists in the South-East and Delta Region.

- Oil militancy and piracy in southern Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta.

- Election-related violence, with the next elections just over a year away.

- Pan-national use of kidnap as a business model.

According to the Global Peace Index 2021, Nigeria ranked 146th out of 163 countries (compared to 147th position in the previous year).

### 3.7.1. TERRORISM.

The official name of the founding group of Boko Haram is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad." With its origin in 2002 as a local Salafist group led by Mohammed Yusuf, the group then launched an insurrection in 2009 that failed, and Yusuf was killed while in police custody. However, with the benefit of links it established with al-Qaida, Boko Haram rebounded under the leadership of by Yusuf's more war-like successor, Abubakar Shekau.

In 2015, the group switched allegiance to the so-called Islamic State. A year later, though, JAS fractured when the Islamic State transferred its support to Yusuf's son, Abu-Musab al-Barnawi, who opposed Shekau's indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians. Al-Barnawi's group took the name of Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) and quickly refocused their attacks on the security forces.

In February 2020, three of the most senior leaders of ISWAP were executed by their own men. Idris al-Barnawi, son of Boko Haram founder Mohammad Yusuf and leader of the ISWAP in Nigeria, and two members, Abu Maryam and Abu Zainab. They are believed to have been killed for allegedly "going soft,".

It is unclear who the new leader of ISWAP Nigeria is, but it believed to be either of Abu Shayima or Lawan Abakar Abu-Muhammad. Since 2014, the conflict has spilled into neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger, with the Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG) using the international borders to play off national forces. This was countered by the forming of a Multi-National Combined Joint Task Force (MNCJTF) and the arrangement of 'hot pursuit' rules allowing cross border pursuit.

In 2019, A third NSAG, titled 'Ba Kura' was identified, operating in the SE of the Niger Republic and along the northern Nigerian border of the Lake Chad Basin. Ba Kura was affiliated with the BH/JAS group. This meant that the Lake Chad region was no longer exclusively ISWAP's area of operations. By comparison, ISWAP's reach has expanded further north and into Niger and Chad. ISWAP owes its military successes in part to its novel, flexible strategy, and improved tactics. Over the years it has developed its military capabilities,

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attacking both the large 'super FOB' military bases and identified weaker military targets as well as targeting convoys with ambushes and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Boko Haram continues to operate in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states In 2019, a resurgence and escalation of the Boko Haram crisis was witnessed across north-eastern Nigeria. Since 2019, Boko Haram has sought to extend its reach into north-western Nigeria. Commentators note that the lack of available state protection and the growing insecurity has made communities in the North-West and North-Central Regions of Nigeria increasingly vulnerable to converging threats, including extremism.

JAS remains operationally confined to its stronghold in south-central Borno around the Sambisa Forest, and along the Cameroonian border. Their attacks focus on south-central Borno, including in Maiduguri and along the Cameroonian border. The group has also been reported to be sending fighters to radicalise NSAG groups and establish bases in north-western Nigeria, particularly Niger state.

On 19 May 2021, JAS's leader Abubakar Shekau and his troops were ambushed and captured by ISWAP in the Sambisa Forest, a longtime stronghold of Boko Haram/JAS. ISWAP stated that Shekau was given the opportunity to repent and join ISWAP but chose to initiate a suicide vest which killed him. Remaining JAS elements were subsequently subsumed into ISWAP. Most recently, ISWAP has re-organised the NSAG operations into two Wilaya's (Caliphates), one in the Lake Chad Basin area and the second one in the area of Sambisa Forest to sustain its war against countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They have established a Shura Council which reportedly has re-organised the chain of command to integrate ISWAP, JAS/Ba Kura and JAS/Sambisa operations.

UNDSS product – 22 Aug 2021.

The Shura has decreed various forms of governance to be conducted within the Caliphates. There is a continuous effort to improve the way ISWAP governs, internal reorganization and cleansing its membership, all with an intention to improve its image and 'win hearts and minds' of the local population in BAY states and fill the gap the Nigerian Government was unable to close in the past, especially in remote locations of Borno and Yobe States.

These include:

- Improvement of living conditions in ISWAP prisons.

- Mass releases of detainees from ISWAP informal detention centres.

- Lifting of the ban imposed on fishing and farming activities in the Lake Chad area.

- The use of Sharia Courts to rule on various offences.

- The use of mobile courts and policy units to settle personal and commercial disputes between residents in remote areas.

- Use of preaching to trumpet the advantages of Sharia institutions over 'westerner' institutions.

- The conduct of three types of punishments in Sharia law: prescribed punishments (hudud), retribution (qisas) and discretionary punishments (tazir).

- Implementation of the Islamic concept of zakat (religiously obligatory alms) as a justification for taxing civilians.

- Giving loans in terms of money (for opening businesses), seeds, and fertilizers (for farmers), with fund reimbursement done after the harvest.

Following a slight lull in attacks at the end of 2021, NSAG operations in the North East have resumed in earnest. The aggressive use of Nigeria's newly acquired Super Tucano ground attack aircraft has both disrupted NSAG operations and raised Army morale as they seek to repel the frequent assaults on their FOBs. ISWAP is constantly adapting its Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) to be more immune to air raids. The group is likely to seek to use the population as a human shield, or even, in the future, seek to acquire anti-aircraft weapons such as MANPADS. The recent use of GRAD rockets on Maiduguri represents both changed TTPs and an opportunity to strike against airport with the hope of destroying aircraft on ground.

### 3.7.2. ORGANISED CRIMINAL GANGS.

Organised criminal gangs (OCGs) in North West Nigeria have been behind a surge of kidnappings for ransom targeting boarding schools, travellers and local communities. In the last five years, the North West has experienced the greatest concentration of kidnappings in Nigeria. The ransoms collected through these mass abductions have become a key means of business for these OCGs. Mass school kidnappings in Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna and Katsina states emulate Boko Haram's infamous 2014 kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls and have forced the government to respond. Government spokespeople deny paying ransoms to secure the release of the children, but local accounts contradict this. Moreover, corruption within local government probably plays a part.

As in the North East, kidnapping for ransom has made highways in the region very dangerous for travel. Additionally, the OCGs conduct regular raids on local communities to rustle cattle, loot foodstuffs and take further opportunity hostages. Despite the ongoing efforts of Operation Hadarin Daji, involving combined arms operations similar to those seen in the North East, the Security Forces successes have so far failed to properly suppress OCG activities.

The activities of these OSGs in the North West is attracting the attention of militant Islamist groups. Ansaru has deployed clerics to the region to preach against democracy and government peace efforts. There is also some evidence that ISWAP is developing ties to North West criminal groups in an attempt to radicalize them. The Niger State Government has recently declared ISWAP cells within the state, citing evidence that OCGs are demand levies from the local populations, a tactic already seen in Borno State's northern LGAs.

### 3.7.3. AGRO-PASTORAL CLASHES.

Primarily affecting the Middle Belt and increasingly states in the South West and South East, clashes between farmers and herders over land have spurred the formation of ethnic militias, vigilante raids, and extrajudicial killings.

Historically, the Middle Belt states have been the fertile plains and grazing lands of Nigeria where nomadic pastoralist and sedentary agriculturalist groups coexisted, traded, and turned to local peacekeeping mechanisms when land disputes arose. However, desiccation and large land allocations to estate owners have pushed herders off their historical grazing routes and forced them southwards. Likewise, according to aerial analysis by the U.S. Geological Survey, land available for open grazing in Nigeria's Middle Belt declined by 38 percent between 1975 and 2013, while the area dedicated to farming nearly trebled. These dynamics have been driven by climate shifts, exclusionary land policies, and population growth. Meanwhile, demand for meat supplied by the country's herders is rising.

This central swathe of Nigeria is also where the northern socio-political zone of the country meets the southern zone. This is a region of cultural exchange where dozens of languages are spoken and where no individual group has a clear political majority—national election margins are the closest in Middle Belt states. National politicians, large land holders, and their allies in the press have seized on these dynamics to politicize clashes between farmers and herders and between so-called "settlers" and "indigenous" communities in the region. Conspiracy theories and claims of coverups and ethnic cleansing around violence in the Middle Belt are common—and recycled even by well-meaning humanitarian groups and analysts. Despite this frequent framing in communal terms, religion and regional affiliation are not primary drivers of conflict. This is demonstrated by the fact that Islam-practicing Fulani and Hausa militias are often adversaries in these communal clashes.

### 3.7.4. SOUTH-EAST MILITANCY.

Revived Biafran secessionist activities have escalated in recent years, leading to violent clashes between Nigeria's security forces and militia groups and resulting in dozens of deaths.  In December 2020, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) established what it calls the Eastern Security Network (ESN) to act as a paramilitary force in the region. Based on their rhetoric and goals broadcast on social media, this group seems more focused on mobilizing grievances against Fulani herders than advocating for autonomy in the region. ESN has declared that it will enforce a ban on grazing in the South East, stoking anti-Fulani sentiment. Nigerian courts have the Federal Government's proscription of IPOB as a terrorist group.

Nigerian security forces and ESN clashed in a series of skirmishes in 2021 that resulted in the deaths of several civilians in what has become known as the Orlu crisis. ESN has inflamed tensions by reportedly killing police officers at checkpoints in several locations in the South East.  A new Delta based organisation, the Niger Delta People's Salvation Force (NDPSF), has also started operations against Security Forces in support of IPOB objectives.

### 3.7.5. PIRACY AND OIL MILITANCY.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea was now the worst in the world in 2020 with 35 recorded piracy events off the coast of Nigeria, accounting for over 95 percent of crew members kidnapped.  However, piracy events reduced considerably during 2021. The groups behind these attacks are shadowy, but a number of pirate enterprises are known to be connected to the armed groups that have for decades sabotaged pipelines and kidnapped oil workers in Nigeria's Delta (South South and South East regions).

Groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) and Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate (NDGJM) have been difficult to address through security operations alone due their decentralized and leaderless structures, local support, and their tactics of striking quickly and disappearing into the Niger delta's many river branches.

As oil companies have spent heavily to improve security to protect the oil infrastructure, some groups have adjusted their focus and ventured from their swampland hideouts to board international ships in the Gulf of Guinea. They then retreat to their bases with kidnapped crew to negotiate ransoms with shipping companies.

### 3.7.6. KIDNAP.

Kidnap numbers have been very high during 2021, even more so that the bumper year of 2020. Between 01 January and 31 December 2021 there were 3,410 reported kidnaps or kidnap attempts, during which 5,134 individuals became kidnap victims.



ACLED data – Apr 2021.

Figure 1. Source - ACLED and Nigerian Bureau of Statistics.

# 4. COUNTRY-WIDE SRA.

## 4.1. INDIVIDUAL RISK DESCRIPTION & ESTIMATION.

### 4.1.1. TERRORISM.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team or member of the general public being killed or injured by a terrorist attack against the vaccination location itself or nearby targets including other building in use by the programme roll out.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **(VBIED) Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device** | An attack using a parked or moving vehicle (including lorry, car, motorized rickshaw or moped) to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the programme storage or vaccination delivery points. | Although this is a recognized method of terrorist attack, there is no history of the use of this method of attack against any medical facilities or vaccination programmes and no intelligence that suggests such targeting in the future. However, there is risk of collateral involvement in the event of VBIED attack on supporting security forces, with historical precedence of such risk in the North East. |
| **(PBIED) Person Borne IED** | An attack using a person(s) to deliver an explosive charge(s) to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the programme storage or vaccination delivery points. | Although this is a recognized method of terrorist attack, there is no history of the use of this method of attack against any medical facilities or vaccination programmes and no intelligence that suggests such targeting in the future. However, there is risk of collateral involvement in the event of VBIED attack on supporting security forces, with historical precedence of such risk in the North East. |

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| Armed attack | An attack by single or teams of people using guns, IED's and grenades to injure or kill people at close quarters, either during the attack or by a delayed hostage scenario, using the media to maximum effect. | This is a recognized modus operandi for terrorist groups in the North-East. Medical clinics and associated vehicles have been a frequent target for BH/ISWAP during town incursions. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 - Terrorism | 2 | 4 | **MEDIUM** |

### 4.1.2. CRIME.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by a criminal event such as a mugging, theft, extortion or act of physical violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements that has a serious impact on the programme delivery (theft of vaccine, equipment etc.) or reputation of the programme.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| Armed Attack | An attack by single or teams of people, including OCGs, using guns to injure or kill people at close quarters. This is often associated with community invasion for looting rustling and kidnap. | A direct risk to staff, either because the programme is directly targeted or collateral damage as a result of being in the proximity to an attack on supporting security forces. |
| Sexual Attack | Programme member of staff falling victim to a sexual assault resulting in harassment, sexual disease, injury or death. | Incidents of rape regularly occur in towns and cities as well as in hotels and private homes. The risk is country wide. |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Organised crime** | Infiltration of an organised criminal group into the running of the vaccination programme itself, resulting in fraud, theft, loss of assets/funds, employment malpractice or adverse publicity for NCDC and State Health Ministry if exposed. | There are criminal gangs who may seek to exploit programme operations by coercion, extortion or black mail. |
| **Theft** | Programme member of staff falls victim to a criminal act, either losing valuables or money, by mugging or pickpocketing, or some other form of theft from their person or the items are taken whilst unattended in common areas, programme storage or delivery sites, or from staff accommodation. | Petty crime is ubiquitous across the country. Staff will need to be cautious throughout programme delivery. Programme delivery sites might attract opportunistic and determined thieves, possibly as members of an OCG, if presented with an environment conducive to their trade. Staff members returning home experience mugging risk. |
| **Drug taking or smuggling** | Instance of drug taking within program premises for individual use, or the taking place of drug dealing either retail, i.e., to users, or wholesale, to other drug dealers. Use of methanol to enhance low grade alcohol resulting in death or injury of the imbiber | Recreational drug taking is widely practiced in some parts of the country. Locally recruited 'casual' staff will require appropriate security vetting during the employment process. |
| **Staff dishonesty** | A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds, equipment or vaccines from the programme itself. | Due to the disparity in wealth within the country there is always a temptation for opportunistic or planned theft to occur. Risks are elevated where short term casual staff are recruited. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| **2 - Crime** | 4 | 3 | **HIGH** |

### 4.1.3. CIVIL UNREST.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by unrest caused by rioting, demonstrations or political violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements due to brand ownership of World Bank as an international donor. Any anti-vaccination movement targeting the programme in the form of local protests.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **Community clash/ Riot** | Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being caught in a localised civilian clash or riot | Sectors of the major cities and large towns present heightened risk of a turf war clash between rival gangs or sympathetic riot in support of a perceived wrong. Often, violent civilian protest will occur as a result of the use of excessive force by security personnel. |
| **Demonstration/ Protest** | Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being caught in a protest or demonstration either directed towards the programme or a local but unconnected issue. | As above |
| **Political violence** | Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being affected or injured by political violence associated by an election or local political issue that is associated with the area or specifically in relation to the vaccination programme | Political activity will increase exponentially in the months leading to next year's elections. Political hustings can generate regular and sometimes violent clashes as political alliances become increasingly polarized. This could lead to the escalation of security measures with the associated application of lock-down measures in tempo with the rise in threat. This could cause interruption or temporary suspension of programme delivery. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 - Civil Unrest | 4 | 3 | **HIGH** |

### 4.1.4. TRAVEL RISK.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being killed or injured by a natural catastrophe such as tsunami or earthquake. Incidence of the vaccination centre being closed, damaged or destroyed by such an event. Damage to vaccine stocks or other equipment required for roll out.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **RTA** | Incidence of a programme vehicle being involved in a road traffic accident whilst effecting delivery of personnel or vaccine supplies to programme sites. | RTAs occur regularly due to poor roads, badly maintained vehicles and poor driving skills. RTAs whilst over speeding often result in serious injuries or fatalities. |
| **Vehicle Theft or Hijack** | Incidence of a programme vehicle being stolen whilst parked and unattended, or actively hijacked from programme personnel following and encounter with an IVCP. | Opportunity vehicle theft can occur if vehicles have insufficient security out of hours. Vehicle hijack is a possibility but often vehicles are abandoned, and the personnel are kidnapped. IVCPs can occur anywhere but are very prevalent in the regions where terrorists and OCGs are operating. |
| **Boat Accident** | Incidence of a boat accident where programme activities require the movement of personnel and stores by water. | Boat accidents occur where poor safety measures are followed – overloading, over speeding and failure to wear life jackets. |

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**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4 - Travel Risk | 3 | 3 | **MEDIUM** |

### 4.1.5. KIDNAP.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

A programme member of staff is kidnapped either during work or out of hours, resulting in disruption to programme delivery.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| Kidnap for Ransom | The kidnap and detention of a programme member of staff until a cash ransom is paid. | Kidnap for ransom remains an enduring risk across the country, driven by the disparity in wealth and lack of employment prospects. Kidnaps are often conducted by OCGs. The past year has seen a surge in kidnaps in the North-West and North-Central regions. However, the risk is pervasive across almost the entire country. A country wide vaccination programme will necessarily need constant and effective media marketing. This will bring the programme to the attention of OCGs, potentially increasing risk. |
| Express Kidnap (One Chance) | The short-term kidnap of a programme member of staff in order to force the removal of available cash from ATMs. | Express kidnap is particularly prevalent where there is wealth and a high frequency of ATMs, as found in the commercial centres of major cities, towns and suburb hubs. |

| Ideological kidnap | The kidnap and detention of a programme member of staff in order to achieve political aims. | Ideological kidnap occurs in the North-East, where insurgents unfortunately often use the execution of their victims to spread terror and support their media campaigns. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 - Kidnap | 3 | 4 | **HIGH** |

### 4.1.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

The contraction of disease, sickness or workplace accident of such severity as to need an emergency response and temporary of long-term hospitalisation of a staff member.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **Disease** | Incidence of a member of staff contracting an endemic disease as a result of their programme delivery and/or interaction with target stakeholders, causing them to be unable to work or requiring their hospitalisation/isolation. | Although there are many endemic diseases in the country, it anticipated that the nature of the work will engender a very high level of personal and programme sanitation. Such SOPs will significantly reduce the risk. |
| **Sickness** | Incidence of sickness due to personal physiology or due to the ingestion of a sick bug, causing them to be unable to work. | Despite programme and personal sanitary drills, people regularly fall ill due to chronic conditions or food poisoning. This is a perennial risk for all. |
| **Accident** | Incidence of a work-related accident during programme delivery which is of such severity that they are temporarily or | Accidents regularly occur in work environments and particularly where there are high numbers of people. The |

| | |
|---|---|
| permanently unable to continue their duties. | risk of serious accident will be reduced by proper planning, rehearsals and the strict adherence to safety SOPs. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 7 – Medical Emergency | 2 | 3 | **LOW** |

### 4.1.7. FIRE EVENT.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Damage or destruction of a programme facility, related equipment or to personnel, as a result of a fire.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **Arson** | The malicious use of fire to cause the damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment or personnel. | Arson is often used by ex-staff members who bear a grudge, possibly due to being sacked or failing to obtain employment. Arson is also used as a tool to raise tensions by political agitators. In certain parts of the country the political and community dynamics may elevate arson as a risk to the programme. |
| **Fire outbreak** | The collateral involvement in a fire event causing damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment or personnel due to the dense and chaotic nature of the urban landscape. | Fire is a particular risk in the vicinity of urban market areas, slums and other zones where illegal and haphazard building has been allowed to occur. This risk is elevated in certain parts of the major towns and cities. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 - Fire Event | 2 | 2 | **LOW** |

### 4.1.8. ENVIRONMENT (NATCAT).

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Incidence of a member of programme staff being killed or injured by a natural catastrophe such as flooding or high wind or lightening.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| Flood | Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured by drowning or crush injuries created by the force of water | Tropical storms can generate very high volumes of localised rainfall in short periods of time. In cities, flooding can quickly occur due to poor sanitation resulting in drain blockage. In rural areas, flash flooding can occur in low lying areas whilst sheet floods can wash away roads across flat areas in the North. Although there is risk, this should be countered with proper planning and coordination. |
| High wind | Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured, or the damage or destruction of programme assets, due to very high wind gusts. | The risk is not necessarily from the wind itself but from projectiles picked up and accelerated by the force of the wind. This is an occasional, usually very short-term risk during the rainy season. |
| Lightning | Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured as a result of lightning. | A high incidence of lightning is common in the vicinity of tropical storms during the rainy season. Tropical storms are more frequent and occur over the greatest part of the year in the south of the country. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

**33**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 - Environment | 2 | 2 | **LOW** |

### 4.1.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

A failure to properly plan delivery sequencing, inform stakeholders and train programme staff in advance of project start, risks unexpected issues which will delay, alarm and potentially cause the failure of the programme.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **Covid protocols** | A failure to insist on strict Covid protocols at vaccination centres causes these same centres to become Covid supper spreader fulcrums. | The pre-roll out communication exercise needs to fully inform stakeholders of the protocol requirements to be applied in order to enter a vaccination clinic and inform stakeholders of the queueing protocols once admitted to sites. Failure to adhere to advertised protocols risks further spread of Covid. |
| **ID capture** | A failure to capture reliable information on the numbers being vaccinated progressively throughout the programme results in doubts as to data efficacy and ultimately a loss of confidence in the process. | Poor pre-roll out communication risks stakeholders being unable to provide ID on arrival at vaccination centres. Any IT based data capture system risks interruption due to power loss and will need to be rugged to operate in the field. |
| **SF discord with Civilian population** | Incidence of elements of the supporting security force generating tension due to their discord with the local community. | In certain areas the security forces have a very fractious relationship with the local community and are looked on with fear and suspicion. |

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**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|-----------|-----------|----------|-------|
| 9      -   Programmatic | 3 | 2 | LOW |

### 4.1.10.    DEPLOYMENT.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Operational and logistical aspects of the programme roll out face risk interruption to vaccine delivery to field sites and, potentially, risk to vaccine efficacy if vaccine storage temperatures can't be maintained. In certain areas, distance and poor road conditions could impact on staff deployments and vaccine centre opening/closing times.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|-----------|---------------------|------------|
| **Distribution interruption** | Poor logistical management causing interruption of vaccine supply to the field, leading to delays in the overall programme | Poor coordination of transport and supplies will cause delay in delivery. Security challenges could trigger decision points within the security framework which cause temporary or permanent cessation of programme delivery in specific areas. These challenges will be present in remote areas and in the many regions of heightened security threat. |
| **Power Interruption** | Incidence of power interruption leading to write off of vaccine stock due to heat damage. (According to brand, Covid 19 vaccines must be stored within a relatively narrow temperature range). | Unless mitigations are put in place at each delivery point for the duration of the vaccination exercise, the risk of vaccine damage due to power loss is a perennial one across the country. |

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|---|---|---|
| **Unexpected vaccination window extension** | Incidence of interruption to the smooth deployment of stock and medical delivery of vaccinations leading to unplanned extension of the delivery time period. | Unplanned time extensions to programme delivery risk disruption elsewhere in the programme and potentially increase risk to staff due to extended presence in high-risk areas. |

## OVERALL RISK RATING:

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 - Deployment | 3 | 3 | **MEDIUM** |

### 4.1.11.    POLITICAL.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

The concurrent acceleration of political campaigns in the lead up to the 2023 elections could impinge, tangentially or directly, on the programmes ability to deliver effectively. In certain areas of the country the government's authority and control is challenged (ISWAP's declared Caliphates in the North-East and IPOB's 'Biafraland' in the South-East). In these areas there is increased security risk which will challenge the programmes ability to access areas and deliver vaccines.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **Elections** | Concurrent political campaigns causing dilution to programme communications or directly impacting the effectiveness of the vaccine delivery programme. | Electoral news will take more and more news time as the election nears. Communication of vaccine roll out risks being squeezed out of air time and print space. Political activists could use the vaccine programme as a vehicle to attack the political opposition. |

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| Traditional Rulers | Failure to apply the correct notification protocols in the lead up to vaccine delivery causing a snub to the traditional ruler in that area. A withdrawal of royal or religious approval could result in a loss of buy in by the local community. | Local cultural protocols are an important part of community life. A failure to both understand and follow the correct procedures could result in a very poor turn out at vaccine centres. |
|---|---|---|
| Contested Areas | Incidence of restricted access. Programme delivery might not be possible in certain parts of the country where the legitimate government's authority is being challenged. | Certain LGAs in Borno State and parts of some South-East states could pose additional security risks that will require additional planning and security mitigation. Even then, there is a risk that some areas might have to be declared 'no-go'. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 11 - Political | 3 | 3 | MEDIUM |

### 4.1.12.      CORRUPTION.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Incidence of corruption impacting the programme. Corruption is a pervasive fact of business life and can be found across government institutions in the country. This  allows for fraud and embezzlement to occur with almost total impunity.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| Staff dishonesty | A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds from the programme itself. | Fraud or embezzlement of funds could rapidly sap the tempo and vigour of the vaccine programme roll out, resulting in |

**37**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | failure to vaccinate large parts of the population. |
| **Extortion** | Extraction of resources from the programme by a staff member because they have been placed under duress by a third party. | Locally recruited programme staff could be placed in this situation by criminal elements within the local community. |
| **Bribery** | Incentivization of programme staff to disrupt or cause the failure of the vaccine programme. | Politically motivated agents could seek to disrupt the programme in order to make the incumbent government (federal, state or local) look weak and disorganized. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12           -   Corruption | 3 | 2 | **MEDIUM** |

### 4.1.13.      COMMUNICATION.

**SCOPE OF RISK:**

Failure to properly inform and forewarn communities of the vaccine programme could result in poor attendance. Failure to coordinate the sequence of community attendance could result in excessive crowds and increased risk of disorder. The use of social media to publish false news or counter narratives by traditionalists or politically motivated opposition could result in poor attendance or a mass refusal to take the vaccine.

**RISK SCENARIOS:**

| Risk name | Description of risk | Estimation |
|---|---|---|
| **Sensitization** | Poor communication and lack of timely programme advertising resulting in low | A weak and poorly structured communication campaign risks failure to |

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| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | take up of the vaccine amongst communities | properly notify everyone of the programmes timings and intent. |
| **Coordination** | Failure to coordinate attendance scheduling, resulting in excessive queues with long waiting times, generating dissent and potential civil unrest. | Poor notification of attendance schedules poses a risk of excessive numbers and crowd management challenges at vaccine delivery sites. |
| **False News** | Incidence of social media challenges as to the efficacy of the vaccines versus traditional medicines, generating doubt and leading to low turnout at vaccine centres. | The use of social media to sow false information is a recognised problem in countries which already have high vaccine take up. |
| **Counter Narratives** | Incidence of anti-establishment commentary suggesting that the vaccine programme is a government plot to infect the population with unknown chemicals, resulting in stakeholder refusal to be vaccinated. | The use of social media to plant doubt and fear in the minds of the population is a recognised problem in countries which already have high vaccine take up. |

**OVERALL RISK RATING:**

| Risk name | Likelihood | Severity | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 - Communication | 3 | 3 | **MEDIUM** |

**39**

## 4.2. RISK MATRIX PRE-MITIGATION.

### 4.2.1. RISK MAP.



| | Threat Scenario | | Impact | | Probability | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Terrorism | 3.8 | Severe | 2.5 | Possible | Medium |
| 2 | Crime | 3.8 | Severe | 4.4 | Highly Likely | High |
| 3 | Civil Unrest | 3.3 | Moderate | 4.1 | Highly Likely | High |
| 4 | Travel risk | 3 | Moderate | 3.2 | Likely | Medium |
| 5 | Kidnap | 4 | Severe | 3 | Likely | High |
| 6 | Medical Emergency | 3.3 | Moderate | 2.1 | Possible | Low |
| 7 | Fire Event | 2.9 | Moderate | 2.2 | Possible | Low |
| 8 | Environmental (Weather) | 2.2 | Minor | 2.6 | Likely | Low |
| 9 | Programmatic | 2.3 | Minor | 3.4 | Likely | Low |
| 10 | Deployment | 3.3 | Moderate | 3.3 | Likely | Medium |
| 11 | Political | 3 | Moderate | 3.4 | Likely | Medium |
| 12 | Corruption | 3.4 | Moderate | 3.2 | Likely | Medium |
| 13 | Communication | 3 | Moderate | 2.6 | Likely | Medium |

### 4.2.2. RISK MATRIX SUMMARY.

The biggest threats to a nationwide Covid-19 vaccination programme, classified as HIGH, come from the wide range of crimes perpetrated by those with criminal intent. These threats are pervasive, whether in the built urban environment or in the depths of rural countryside. A specific element of crime is the application of kidnap or abduction. The majority of kidnaps are associated with the expectation of a ransom payment. However, there are also kidnaps associated with political and ideological motivation.

High levels of poverty, unemployment and a general disenchantment with the cards that have been dealt, can often result in inter-community friction (be that agro-pastoral or inter-tribal), gang/cult turf wars, and a very low trigger threshold to spark off protest, mass unrest or riot.

The kidnap and general crime risks, coupled with poor standards of driving and vehicle maintenance, as well as highly variable road surfaces, mean that travel within the country becomes fraught and is a MEDIUM risk to the movement of both staff and logistics required to deliver the vaccination programme.

Across the country, Terrorism is a MEDIUM generic threat but there are an increasing number of rural parts of the country where this risk will be HIGH.

Given that corruption is embedded within the Nigerian business psyche and that the political dynamic will be increasingly pervasive as time ticks down to the elections in early 2023, the threats of communication challenges, disruption to a smooth delivery of the programme, or dissolution of effort through corruption or political interference, are also all considered to be MEDIUM threats.

# 5. CONCLUSION OF PART ONE SRA.

## 5.1. SUMMARY.

The security environment in which the Covid-19 vaccination programme seeks to deliver is both increasingly complex and also dynamic. In order to best mitigate changing risks, a Security Management Framework (SMF) needs to be both sufficiently robust and sufficiently flexible to enable programme delivery within a multiplicity of scenarios.

Whilst Part One of the report sets the scene, the SRAs conducted in a representative state in each of the 6 geopolitical zones will add some granularity in exposing the challenges in different parts of the country. Importantly, the SRAs will make recommendations for mitigations to allow risk levels to be reduced to as low a level as possible. The mitigations will be included in the SMF where appropriate to enable the programme to anticipate and manage the risks. Despite everyone's best efforts, inevitably there will the interjection of something unexpected. For these occasions, the programme needs to be ready with a set of Emergency Response Plans and a prepared Crisis Management Team. Part 2 of the report contains SRAs which have been conducted on the following states:

- Sokoto
- Borno
- Niger
- Ebonyi
- Rivers
- Lagos

NCDC CONSULTANCY – TARGET STATES BY GEO-POLITICAL ZONE

The states have been further grouped into North, Middle and Central belts, with Ebonyi adjusted to be captured within the Middle belt for the sake of convenience.

# 6. LIST OF ACRONYMS.

| | |
|---|---|
| CoPREP | COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project |
| FCT | Federal Capital Territory |
| GoN | Government of Nigeria |
| NCDC | Nigeria Center for Disease Control |
| NPF | Nigerian Police Force |
| NPHCDA | National Primary Health Care Development Agency |
| NSCDC | Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp |
| PCU | Project Coordinating Unit |
| SMF | Security Management Framework |
| SRA | Security Risk Assessment |
| VAC | Vaccination Approval Criteria |
| WB | World Bank |
| PHC | Primary Health Center |
| GH | General Hospital |
| SF | Security Forces |
| TTP | Tactic Technique and Procedure |
| MO | Modus Operandi |
| OCG | Organized Criminal Group |
| CMT | Crisis Management Team |
| K & R | Kidnap and Ransom |
| IPOB | Indigenous People of Biafra |
| ESN | Eastern Security Network |
| FCDO | Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office |
| PPE | Personal Protective Equipment |

| | |
|---|---|
| CCTV | Close Circuit Television |
| CMT | Crisis Management Team |
| RTA | Road Traffic Accident |
| MED EVAC | Medical Evacuation |
| DSS | Department of State Security |
| LGA | Local Government Area |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| APC | All Progressive Congress |
| CCTV | Close Circuit Television |
| CMT | Crisis Management Team |
| CoPREP | COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project |
| ESN | Eastern Security Network |
| FCDO | Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office |
| FCT | Federal Capital Territory |
| GoN | Government of Nigeria |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| IPOB | Indigenous People of Biafra |
| ISWAP | Islamic State of West Africa Province |
| IVCP | Illegal Vehicle Check Point |
| LGA | Local Government Area |
| NDM | Niger Delta Militant |
| NPF | Nigerian Police Force |
| NPHCDA | National Primary Health Care Development Agency |
| NSCDC | Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp |
| OCG | Organized Criminal Groups |
| PBIED | Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device |

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| | |
|---|---|
| PCU | Project Coordinating Unit |
| PDP | People's Democratic Party |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| RTA | Road Traffic Accident |
| SMF | Security Management Framework |
| SRA | Security Risk Assessment |
| VAC | Vaccination Approval Criteria |
| VBIED | Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device |
| IPOB | Indigenous People of Biafra |
| ESN | Eastern Security Network |
| FCDO | Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office |
| CCTV | Close Circuit Television |
| CMT | Crisis Management Team |
| RTA | Road Traffic Accident |
| LGA | Local Government Area |
| OCG | Organized Criminal Groups |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| NDM | Niger Delta Militant |
| ISWAP | Islamic State of West Africa Province |
| IVCP | Illegal Vehicle Check Point |
| PBIED | Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device |
| VBIED | Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device |
| IED | Improvised Explosive Device |
| PDP | People's Democratic Party |
| APC | All Progressive Congress |
| PHC | Primary Health Center |

| | |
|---|---|
| GH | General Hospital |
| SF | Security Forces |
| TTP | Tactic Technique and Procedure |
| MO | Modus Operandi |
| AOG | Armed Opposition Group |
| CMT | Crisis Management Team |
| K & R | Kidnap and Ransom |
| ERW | Explosive Remnant of War |
| UXO | Unexploded Ordinances |
| UNHAS | United Nations Humanitarian Air Support |

# 7. REFERENCES

The reference list below represents a consolidated grouping of references made in different parts of the body of work which cumulatively forms the CoPREP Security Report.

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